Abstract: We propose a model for fair electronic cash issued by multiple banks for the first time. A scheme of electronic cash with multiple banks in which a user can be traced is presented by using the improved group signature scheme of Cam97[4] and the group blind signature scheme of Lys98 [16] . A weakness in the design of withdrawal and payment protocols of electronic cash using the existing group signature schemes is pointed out with its reasons analyzed. In addition a way of disposing it is given.
1． Introduction
Secure and efficient electronic payment systems are significant for electronic commerce. Electronic cash (e-cash, or digital cash) is a very important electronic payment system. It can be considered as an imitation of paper money, but is more convenient and economical. In the simplified model of off-line electronic cash system, three types of parities are involved: the users(or customers), the shops and a bank. Four possible transactions may occur between them: registration, withdrawal, payment and deposit. The first electronic cash scheme was suggested by chaum [8] in 1982. In the scheme the technique of blind signatures was used to guarantee the privacy of users. But this complete anonymity of electronic cash can be used for criminal activities, such as money laundering or perfect, i.e., anonymous, blackmailing [18] . For this reason the electronic cash of future should be not fully or conditional anonymous. In 1995, M. Stadler et. al.[17] proposed the concept of 'Fair Blind Signatures'. It can be employed for conditional anonymous of electronic payment systems. In 1996, J. Camenisch et. al.[16] and Y. Frankel et. al.[11] proposed the concept of 'Fair Off-line Electronic Cash' independently. They also presented two schemes of fair off-line electronic cash. The untraceability of fair off-line electronic cash is not completely, it can be revoked by a trusted third party so that the criminal activities making use of the complete anonymity of electronic cash can be prevented.
By now the electronic coins in every fair electronic cash scheme available are issued by one bank. However, in practice it is more convenient to use electronic coins issued by multiple banks. Since in a country or district there may be more than one banks who are able to issue electronic cash. Each of these banks can issue electronic cash of its own. These banks form a group under control of an authorized party such as the Central Bank of the country. In this paper we propose a model for fair electronic cash issued by multiple banks for the first time. A scheme of fair electronic cash with multiple banks in which a user can be traced is presented by using the improved group signature scheme of Cam97 [4] and group blind signature scheme of Lys98 [16] . A disadvantage in the design of withdrawal and payment protocols of electronic cash using the existing group signature schemes is pointed out with its reasons analyzed. Moreover, a way of disposing it is given. The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we introduce some related work. In section 3, a model for fair electronic cash with multiple banks is given with its properties presented. In section 4, a scheme of electronic cash with multiple banks based on the improved group signature scheme of Cam97 [4] and group blind signature scheme of Lys98 [16] , in which a user can be traced is presented with its security and efficiency analyzed. We also point out a weakness in the design of withdrawal and payment protocols of electronic cash using the existing group signature schemes and give a method of disposing it. Two open problems are presented as well. In the last section, we give our conclusion.
2．Related work
There have been many schemes of fair electronic cash issued by only one bank [6] [11][17] [18] . Two kinds of traceability can be realized in a fair electronic cash scheme, i.e., the traceability of user and the traceability of coin. All these schemes have a common feature, i.e., they all involve a trusted third party so that the requirement of fair electronic cash can be satisfied by revoking the anonymity with the help of this trusted third party.. There are many ways to control anonymity in electronic cash schemes [10] , but the technique of fair blind signatures is a commonly used one [6] [17]. The techniques of anonymity control in electronic payment systems were well described by J. Claessens et. al. in [10] .
In a group signature scheme each member of an arbitrary large group is allowed to sign messages on behalf of the whole group, whereas no one but the unique designated group manager can open the signature to find who is the signer, so the anonymity of the signer is protected. For this reason, the techniques of group signatures can be employed in anonymity controlled electronic payment systems. In such systems the group manager takes the role of the trusted third party. Recently, J.Traore [19] proposed a group signature scheme with which he designed a privacy protected off-line electronic cash scheme. However, Traore's electronic cash scheme is not perfect. In his scheme, the group manager would not trace some user if some dishonest users collaborate. In the last part of section four, we point out this weakness with its reason analyzed
We did not find any fair electronic cash schemes with multiple banks in the literature until we were prepared to complete this paper. The concept of electronic cash systems with multiple banks was first proposed by A. Lysyanskaya and Z. Ramzan in FC98 [16] . They also presented an anonymous off-line electronic cash scheme with multiple banks using the techniques of group blind signatures originated from themselves. Their scheme is not practical since it is completely anonymous, and there are too many data need to be transferred in their group blind signature scheme, and the signature is too long. Next we will propose a model for fair electronic cash with multiple banks and present a fair electronic cash scheme using the improved group signature scheme of Cam97 and group blind signature scheme of Lys98 based on elliptic curves. In our scheme the user is traceable.
3．A Model for Fair Electronic Cash Systems with Multiple Banks
In our model there are many banks. They form a group under control of the Central Bank. The Central Bank takes the role of the group manager. Each bank can issue electronic cash. The principals participate in this system are the Central Bank B, many local banks B i , B j, etc., a trusted third party(trustee)T, some users (use U has his own bank B i ), and some shops (shop S has its own bank B j ). Figure 1 It includes the following procedures: Registration： First the user U establishes the relationship of his identity and pseudonym or his identity and his anonymous identity number to the trusted third party so that with this relationship the trusted third party can revoke user anonymity when necessary. At the same time the user gets a certificate issued by the trusted third party that proves his registration. Open account：The user U has his account in his bank B i. Withdrawal：The user U withdraws an electronic coin from his bank B i. Payment：The user U purchases something in the shop S and pays the coin to the shop S. Deposit： The shop S deposits the received coin to his account in his bank B j. Trace： Bank B j send the received coin to the Central Bank B if B j finds something wrong, then the Central Bank B finds bank B i.. . Finally the user can be traced with the help of the trusted third party. For the convenience of the shop to verify the validity of every coin he receives, we assume that all the banks form a group and each bank can issue electronic cash using the techniques of group blind signatures [16] .
Our systems of fair electronic cash with multiple banks have the following properties: 1. The user can spend his electronic coin anonymously. No bank can trace any electronic coin. 2. To check the validity of a received coin the shop just needs to perform a simple verification procedure using a single public key of the bank group. This is very convenient for the shop, since he just needs to know the public key of the bank group. 3. The group of all banks just has one public key, and this public key is independent of the number of banks. Furthermore the length of the group public key does not change with the increase of the number of banks 4.
Given a electronic coin, nobody but the Central Bank can know by which bank it is issued. This can provide anonymity for the banks. 5. No banks including the Central bank can issue electronic coin on behalf of another bank. 6. The Central Bank can determine which bank issued it when an electronic coin is found something wrong, and then this bank can find who is the owner of this coin with the help of the trusted third parity.(i.e. trace back.) 7. Each bank can trace an electronic coin with the help of the trusted third party according to the information supplied by its user.(i.e. trace forward.)
In the next section we design a fair electronic cash scheme that satisfies the properties 1-6 above. In our scheme the user can be traced.
An User Traceable Scheme of Fair Electronic Cash with Multiple Banks

.1 Group Signatures and Signatures of Proof of Knowledge Based on Elliptic Cuirves 4.1.1 Group Signatures
The concept of group signatures was proposed by Chaum and Van Heyst in 1991[9] . Since then many people have studied it, and many good group signature schemes[1] [4] [10] have been presented. In a group signature scheme, members of a given group are allowed to sign messages on behalf of the entire group. In addition, the signatures can be verified using a single group public key Definition 4.1.1: A group signature scheme is a digital signature scheme consists of the following five procedures [2] [4]： Setup：a probabilistic algorithm for generating the group public key Y and a secret key S for the group manager. Join：an interactive protocol between the group manager and a new group member Alice that generates a secret key x, a membership certificate v and a public key for Alice. Sign：a probabilistic algorithm which, on input a message m and a group member's secret key x , returns a signature s on m. verify：an algorithm for establishing the validity of a group signature given the group public key and a signed message. Open：an algorithm which, on input a signature s and the group manager's secret key returns the identity of the signer together with a proof of this fact..
A group signature scheme must satisfy the following security properties: Conditional Anonymity Given a signature, identifying the actual signer is computationally hard for everyone but the group manager. Unforgeability Only group members are able to sign messages on behalf of the group. Unlinkablity It is computationally hard to decide whether two different signatures have been issued by the same group member. Exculpability Neither a group member nor the group manager can sign on behalf of other group members. Traceability The group manager is able to open a signature and identify the actual signer; moreover, a signer cannot prevent the opening of a valid signature.
Coalition Resistance
A colluding subset of group members can not generate valid group signatures that can not be traced.
Group blind signatures
At Financial Cryptography'98, A.Lysyanskaya and Z.Ramzan[16] introduced the concept of group blind signatures and proposed the first realizations of such schemes. Group blind signatures incorporate the properties of both blind signatures and group signatures.
So far, the relatively efficient group signature scheme and group blind signature scheme are group signature scheme of Can97 and group blind signature scheme of A98 respectively. They are based on the same techniques, i.e., the signatures of proof of knowledge of double discrete logarithm(SKLOGLOG) and the signatures of proof of knowledge of the e-th root of discrete logarithm. The discrete logarithms used in these two kinds of signatures are in ordinary multiplicative groups. The amount of data need to be transferred is very large and the signatures are too long, so they are not very practical. In our fair electronic cash scheme we extend the above two schemes to elliptic curves so that the amount of data and the length of signatures are greatly decreased, hence the efficiency is improved.
.1.2 Signatures of proof of knowledge based on elliptic curves
The detailed discussion of proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithm can be found in 
. These discrete logarithms in multiplicative groups can be extended to elliptic curves easily.
The double discrete logarithm of y with respect to base g and h is defined to be x, where
，g is a generator of a group of order p, h is a specified element of * p Z with a large order.
The assumption of double discrete logarithm is: it is hard to find x given
The e-th root of discrete logarithm of y with respect to base g is the integer x satisfying e x g y = .
We call the group generated by g the base group, and the one generated by h the exponent group. Since 
Similar to the case of multiplicative groups, if x is known，then it is simple to construct the two signatures defined above [4] .
The above two kinds of signatures can also be used to sign messages blindly [16] . We will extend them to elliptic curves.
In the following protocol, µ λ, are specified open security parameters, and l S is a permutation group of order l.
Blind SKLOGLOG protocols based on elliptic curves（BSKLOGLOG）:
is a blind signature on m.
To verify the signature one needs to check whether
Blind SKROOTLOG protocols based on elliptic curvs（BSKROOTLOG）:
is the blind signature on m.
Our Scheme of Fair Electronic Cash with Multiple Banks
In our scheme we consider all banks forming a group with the Central Bank as group manager and all users also forming a group with a trusted third party as group manager. Each bank can issue electronic cash using the technique of group blind signatures. Only the unique trusted third parity is able to trace any user using the techniques of group signatures. Our scheme is as follows Setup： The trusted third parity（TTP） selects the parameters: an RSA public key pair (n,e） ，an elliptic
over field GF(p)， a large prime p at least 160 bits in length， an element
, a with order q，a specified element a of * n Z with large order modulo both factors of n, an up bound λ of the length of the keys, and a constant ε . The public key of the user group is (
When a user U registers in TTP，sh/he gets a membership certificate and becomes a legal member of the user group. To do so, sh/he needs to perform the following protocol with the TTP.
repeat the above procedures. 
Similar to a user joining the group of users, a bank i B joins the group of banks and gets its membership certificate ( ) 
The Withdrawal Protocol：
, and sends them to user U ， U randomly chooses 
Payment Protocol：
For a user to pay for a shop sh/he needs to perform the following protocol with the shop. 
Analysis of our scheme
Our system is mainly based on the techniques of group signatures and group blind signatures. Its security is based on RSA assumption and the problem of discrete logarithm on elliptic curves(ECDLP). The security properties of group signatures and group blind signatures assure that every procedure of our scheme is feasible and secure. The analysis of the security of our group signature scheme and group blind signature scheme is similar to the analysis in Cam97[4] and Lys98 [16] . We omit the details because of the limitation of space.
Since we make use of discrete logarithms on elliptic curves, the amount of computation and the amount of data need to be transferred are greatly decreased. The lengths of elements of the multiplicative groups in the schemes of Cam97[4] and Lys98 [16] are required to be 800 bits, while in our scheme the order q of the cyclic subgroup of the elliptic curve group just needs to be at least 160 bits. Furthermore the speed of our scheme is much faster than that of the original group signature scheme of Cam97, and the lengths of signatures in our scheme are much shorter.
Weakness of Electronic cash Schemes with Multiple Banks
So far the research of group signatures is in theoretical, there is still some distance to practical use. Although we have used discrete logarithms on elliptic curves so that the amount of computation and the amount of data need to be transferred are greatly decreased, our scheme is not perfect. Because of the unforgeability of group signatures, in our scheme as well as in other schemes of electronic cash with multiple banks no illegal user can spend electronic coins not belonging to himself. But there is a problem: if dishonest users A and B collude such that A signs messages supplied by a shop with B's secret key and membership certificate, the shop will be cheated and A can double spend this coin or use this coin for criminal activities. When user tracing protocol is executed, it is B not A that is traced. If B revoked his membership before he told his secret key and membership certificate to A, this problem is really hard to solve. The reason resulting in this weakness is that so far there is no group signature scheme that can supply the function of secure member deletion. This weakness also exists in the electronic cash scheme of Traore [19] . In fact the group manager can issue CRLs(Certificate Revocation Lists) to publish the certificates and private keys of deleted group members. So the shop can check whether a user signs a message using a deleted certificate and private key. This method can get rid of the above weakness. However to do so the anonymity of the signatures of a deleted group member before his deletion will be removed.
According to the above discussion we present two open problems. The first one is how to design a practical fair electronic cash scheme with multiple banks not necessarily using the techniques of group signatures. The second one is how to design an effective group signature scheme with secure member deletion. This is also an open problem of group signatures. If such a group signature scheme is designed, a fair electronic cash scheme without the above weakness can be designed using the ideas of this paper.
Conclusion
In real life, electronic cash issued by multiple banks is more practical than the one issued by a single bank. So it is necessary to do research on electronic cash systems with multiple banks. So far researches on this aspect is not enough. This paper has presented the first model for fair electronic cash with multiple banks and has designed a user traceable fair electronic cash scheme using the improved group signature scheme of Cam97 [4] and blind group signature scheme of Lys98 [16] . A weakness in the design of withdrawal and payment protocols of electronic cash scheme using the existing group signature schemes is pointed out with its reason analyzed. A way of removing this weakness is also suggested. Finally, two open problems in the research of fair electronic cash systems with multiple banks are presented.
